Introduction
The current 'acquis international' regarding securities consists of the Convention on the Law 
Purpose and contents of the FCD in a nutshell
The main objective of the FCD is to enhance liquidity in the financial markets. To that end, a range of customary (labelled by some as 'archaic') features that are characteristic of security interests and insolvency law are disapplied or relaxed. Article 3 of the FCD disapplies formal requirements relating to the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement or the provision of financial collateral thereunder; Articles 4 and 7 envisage simplified mechanisms for enforcement, including close-out netting; Article 5 envisages a 'right of use', i.e. a general right of disposal, for the collateral taker (which right is thus not limited to default situations); Article 6 prohibits the recharacterization of a title transfer as a security interest (and thus excludes application of 'pledge principles' to fiduciary transfers of title); Article 8 disapplies certain insolvency provisions, notably those relating to the retroactive force of the declaration of insolvency, and envisages the validity of acts also after such a declaration has been made.
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Creation, validity, perfection, enforceability, and admissibility in evidence
The FCD relates to both collateral arrangements that are structured on the basis of a transfer and to those based on a security interest. 8 As to the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability, and admissibility in evidence of either type of collateral arrangement, Article 3 of the FCD provides:
Article 3
Formal requirements
1. Member States shall not require that the creation, validity, perfection, enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement or the provision of financial collateral under a financial collateral arrangement be dependent on the performance of any formal act.
. . .
Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the application of this Directive to financial collateral
only once it has been provided and if that provision can be evidenced in writing and where the financial collateral arrangement can be evidenced in writing or in a legally equivalent manner.
Whereas 'formal acts' are therefore not permitted in this context, the FCD does require the provision of financial collateral as well as evidence in writing or in a legally equivalent manner. 
Priority
The FCD contains no substantive law rules on solving priority conflicts. It should, however, 
Enforcement
Articles 4, 5(5), 6(2), and 7 of the FCD contain detailed rules on the enforcement of collateral arrangements. Enforcement may take place by way of sale, appropriation, or close-out netting.
The most characteristic feature of the FCD is that these enforcement mechanisms may not be subject to formalities, such as prior notice, approval by a court or other independent entity, a public auction or other prescribed manner. 
Scope: tradability
Article 2(1)(e) of the FCD only relates to financial instruments that are 'negotiable' or 'normally dealt in' on the capital market. Securities that are not tradable thus fall outside the FCD regime (as outlined above in sections 2-6). The reasoning behind this exclusion is that non-tradable instruments cannot contribute to liquidity, such contribution being the main justification for deviating from customary rules of security law and insolvency. 
, and shares in undertakings whose exclusive purpose is to own means of production that are essential for the collateral provider's business or to own real property.
The main thrust of this provision is that a collateral provider's own shares or the shares of companies whose financial wellbeing is closely related to that of the collateral provider can be excluded from the scope of the FCD. The underlying rationale is that such shares are likely to be of (very) limited value to a collateral taker when the collateral provider defaults, i.e., at the very moment when such value matters most. Upon the collateral provider's default, the value of its shares and of those of related enterprises may fall substantially, while there may also no longer be a liquid market for such shares. According to a report by the European Commission, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and Sweden have made (partial) use of this opt-out.
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Personal scope
The liberal regime contemplated by the FCD gave rise to lively debate on the appropriate personal scope of the Directive prior to its adoption and during the implementation process. In its current form, the Directive applies where at least one of the parties to a collateral arrangement is a financial market participant, while Member States have the option to limit the scope of the Directive to agreements where both parties qualify as such (thus notably excluding natural persons and non-financial small and medium-sized enterprises). 14 Following the financial crisis, there were again calls in the legal literature to limit the scope of the FCD to wholesale financial market participants. 15 The underlying policy question is whether the special regime of the FCD, which is justified in that it is intended to promote liquidity, should also be applied in sectors of the economy where liquidity is not a major issue. 
Concluding remark
